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How should we think about regulating our dynamically changing financial system? Existing
regulatory approaches have two temporal flaws. The obvious flaw, driven by politics and human
nature, is that financial regulation is overly reactive to past crises. The Dodd-Frank Act, for
example, puts much weight on reforming mortgage financing.
There is, however, a less obvious flaw: that financial regulation is normally tethered to the
financial architecture, including the distinctive design and structure of financial firms and
markets, in place when the regulation is promulgated. This type of grounded regulation can
have value as long as it is monitored and updated as needed to adapt to changes in the
financial architecture. Yet without that monitoring and updating, it can quickly become outmoded
—such as occurred in 2008 when the pre-crisis financial regulatory framework, based on the
dominance of bank-intermediated funding, failed to address a collapsing financial system in
which the majority of funding had become non-bank intermediated.
The Functional Regulation of Finance argues that financial regulation should transcend a timebound architecture. This could be done by regulating the underlying, and thus less timedependent, economic functions of the financial system—the provision, allocation, and
deployment of financial capital—as well as the financial system’s capacity to serve as a network
within which those functions can be conducted. (This functional approach should not be
confused with what is sometimes called a functional approach to financial supervision, in which
the supervisory agency’s jurisdiction is based not on entities but on the business being
transacted; my article addresses how rules should be substantively designed, not how they
should be bureaucratically supervised.)
My article first examines how “microprudential” financial regulation could improve the functioning
of the components of the financial system—firms and markets—by identifying their functions
and then considering how regulation could correct market failures that impede those functions
(especially market failures that undermine the reliability of pricing, since funding depends on
reliable pricing). Among other things, the article shows that microprudential regulation cannot
perfectly correct those market failures. Furthermore, it shows that some of the inevitable market
failures can have systemic consequences. That leads to a discussion of macroprudential
regulation—regulation to protect the financial system’s capacity to serve as a network within
which its underlying functions can be conducted
Policymakers and regulators recognize the need for macroprudential regulation, but they tend to
view it as a loose assortment of “tools” in their “toolkit.” It is unclear, though, which tools should
be used in which circumstances, or how the tools should be calibrated. That itself creates risk
because a misapplication—such as imposing excessively restrictive leverage or credit and
credit-growth ceilings—may be as likely to cause financial problems as to solve them.
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Macroprudential regulation should be less ad hoc. Ideally, it should work ex ante, eliminating
the triggers of systemic shocks. The article demonstrates, however, that may not be feasible. As
already mentioned, some market failures will inevitably have systemic consequences.
Furthermore, other vulnerabilities of the financial system can trigger systemic shocks, and some
of them—such as maturity transformation, the asset-liability mismatch that results from the
short-term funding of long-term projects; and limited corporate liability, which allows firms to
externalize harm and thus potentially motivates risky corporate conduct—are not merely
vulnerabilities but also potential benefits of the financial system. Additionally, the financial
system effectively comprises a high-risk system that is susceptible to “normal accidents,” so
regulators cannot even predict all the triggers of systemic shocks.
Regardless of regulation, therefore, the financial system is likely to retain vulnerabilities that can
trigger systemic shocks. Accordingly, macroprudential regulation should also work ex post, to
help mitigate the harm from systemic shocks that inevitably will occur. This approach accords
with chaos theory, which addresses the problem of inevitable systemic shocks in complex
engineering systems; the most successful systems are those in which the consequences of
failures are limited.
To accomplish that, the regulation should seek to break the transmission and limit the impact of
those shocks. The design of that regulation should be partly informed by the risk factors that
influence the transmission and impact of systemic shocks—which include interconnectedness,
size, and substitutability. Regulation cannot completely break the transmission of systemic
shocks because (among other reasons) the transmission mechanisms cannot all be identified.
The article therefore also explores how regulation could limit the impact of systemic shocks by
stabilizing systemically important financial firms and markets impacted by the shocks. That
could be done by requiring those firms and markets to be more internally robust, or by providing
appropriate liquidity to those firms and markets.
Financial regulation has long focused on requiring traditional deposit-taking banks to be robust,
usually through capital and solvency requirements. Since the financial crisis, the United States
and other countries are beginning to also subject “systemically important” non-bank financial
firms to these requirements. A functional regulatory approach to limiting the impact of systemic
shocks could likewise impose capital and solvency requirements. Significantly, though, a
functional regulatory approach could also be more flexible, avoiding the need to impose those
requirements.
Traditional regulation is inflexible because it implicitly (and confusingly) mixes microprudential
and macroprudential regulatory goals. The only goal of functional macroprudential regulation
should be to protect the financial system’s capacity to function as a network. It need not,
therefore, impose capital or solvency requirements on individual firms—even those that are
systemically important—so long as it otherwise protects the financial system’s capacity to
function as a network. This regulatory flexibility is important because capital and solvency
requirements do not always efficiently reduce systemic risk.
In closing, I observe that my article’s functional approach is primarily normative. Nonetheless, it
provides regulatory ordering principles that should have practical utility, at least as a set of
standards to inform actual regulatory design.
The full paper is available for download here.
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